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    期待WPA2的协议漏洞
    Submitted by 云舒 on 2010, July 24, 11:11 PM. 技术

    WPA2 uses two types of keys: 1) Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), which is unique to each client, for protecting unicast traffic; and 2) Group Temporal Key (GTK) to protect broadcast data sent to multiple clients in a network. PTKs can detect address spoofing and data forgery. "GTKs do not have this property," according to page 196 of the IEEE 802.11 standard.

    These six words comprise the loophole, Ahmad says.

    Because a client has the GTK protocol for receiving broadcast traffic, the user of that client device could exploit GTK to create its own broadcast packet. From there, clients will respond to the sending MAC address with their own private key information.

    Ahmad says it took about 10 lines of code in open source MadWiFi driver software, freely available on the Internet, and an off-the-shelf client card for him to spoof the MAC address of the AP, pretending to be the gateway for sending out traffic. Clients who receive the message see the client as the gateway and "respond with PTKs", which are private and which the insider can decrypt, Ahmad explains.

    http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/wireless/2010/072610wireless1.html

     
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